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Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does
such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are
relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in
turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on
redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality
aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the ‘‘rich’’ are in
majority. With a ‘‘poor’’ majority, we ﬁnd that redistribution outcomes look as if all
voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Mounting evidence suggests that people have heterogeneous preferences for fair distribution (e.g. Bellemare et al.,
2008, see Camerer, 2003 for a survey). For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2010:93) note that ‘‘individuals have views
regarding redistribution that go beyond the current and future states of their pocketbooks. These views reﬂect different
ideas about what an appropriate shape of the income distribution is: in practice, views about acceptable levels of
inequality’’.1 While much research has investigated the effects of social preferences on bargaining, labor markets and
contracting (e.g. Cabrales et al., 2010; Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Fehr et al., 2009), economists have devoted surprisingly
little attention to the question of how such fairness preferences may affect democratic redistribution (see e.g. Dhami and
Al-Nowaihi (2010) and Galasso (2003) for theoretical work). This lack of attention may be driven by the apparently
plausible intuition that the extent to which fairness concerns induce redistribution simply depends on how pronounced
‘‘views about acceptable levels of inequality’’ are in a given population. In this paper, we show that this intuition is
misleading and that structural factors are relevant too.the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), under Project no. S 103070-G14.
. Ho¨chtl), Rupert.Sausgruber@uibk.ac.at (R. Sausgruber),
s in the ﬁeld. For example, Downs (1957:27) noted: ‘‘In reality, men are not always selﬁsh, even in
vidually irrational because they believe it is socially rational i.e., it beneﬁts others even though it
-NC-ND license. 
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–1421 1407This paper shows experimentally that the effect of a given share of fair-minded voters on redistribution outcomes
depends on the structure of income classes, in particular which class is in majority and the relative size of the classes.
By virtue of random allocation of subjects to treatments, we control that the distribution of voters with a concern for
fairness is the same in all of our treatments. By virtue of experimental control over material payoffs, we control the
‘‘pocketbook interest’’ of voters, i.e. the redistribution level that maximizes a voter’s income. We then vary structural
parameters (i.e. which class is in majority) to identify the causal effect of class structure on redistribution outcomes. We
show that the discrepancy between observed and predicted, according to pocketbook interests, redistribution is
asymmetric in majority voting. The discrepancy tends to be pronounced if few fair-minded voters sufﬁce to tip the
balance, but essentially no discrepancy occurs when many are needed.
We demonstrate this asymmetric effect of preferences for a fair distribution on redistribution outcomes in a laboratory
experiment with two homogeneous income classes, which we call the ‘‘rich’’ and the ‘‘poor’’ for convenience. Participants
decide on a one-dimensional redistribution parameter (which can be thought of as a compound of a tax and per capita
redistribution of tax revenues) in a majority vote. Parameters are such that the pocketbook interests of the ‘‘rich’’ are for
low, and those of the ‘‘poor’’ for intermediate redistribution. The poor prefer intermediate rather than extreme
redistribution because higher redistribution levels reduce efﬁciency (as in e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Thus, the
median-voter model with strictly self-interested voters predicts low redistribution if the rich are in majority but
intermediate redistribution if the poor are in majority.
Now suppose that some voters have a preference for a fair distribution, i.e. suppose that some voters are ‘‘inequality
averse’’ (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Such fair-minded voters demand more redistribution than
otherwise identical, purely self-interested voters. To illustrate the asymmetry effect, assume that the rich and the poor are
equally concerned with fairness and that all voters vote sincerely. If the rich are a narrow majority, i.e. they are the median
class, few fair-minded rich sufﬁce to tip the balance and a fair-minded rich voter is likely to be pivotal. If the poor are in
majority, (moderately) fair-minded rich cannot move the median position, and many fair-minded poor voters are required
to move the median position beyond the pocketbook interest of the poor. Thus, fair-minded voters are unlikely to be
pivotal in this case. In summary, the probability that a fair-minded voter is pivotal depends on the class structure in
majority voting. The probability is high when the median class demands relatively low levels of redistribution and when it
is a small majority (we show in the online supporting materials that the asymmetry result extends to a continuum of
voters and any ﬁnite number of income classes).
Our experimental design tests how the asymmetric effect of inequality aversion depends on the class structure in two
ways. First, we test if the asymmetry is present when we expect it to be present. We compare redistribution outcomes in
majority voting when the rich are in majority vs. when the poor are in majority, holding everything else constant. In line
with the asymmetry hypothesis, we observe redistribution beyond the pocketbook interest of the rich when they are in
majority but we do not observe redistribution beyond the pocketbook interest of the poor when the poor are in majority.
Second, we test if the asymmetry is absent when we expect it to be absent. We implement control treatments with the
same class structure as in the main treatments, but in which the probability to be pivotal does not depend on the class
structure by design. In these ‘‘random dictator’’ treatments the probability to be pivotal is exogenous and same for all
voters, independent of whether they are rich or poor. In line with the asymmetry hypothesis, we observe that the deviation
from pocketbook outcomes is not different for a rich or a poor majority.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of our paper is that we identify structural conditions under which (by virtue of
randomization) given preferences for fair distribution matter much and, perhaps more surprisingly, when they matter
little. This is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel demonstration of the well-known phenomenon that the aggregate
outcome may look as if all individuals were rational and self-interested when, in fact, deviations from this reference case
are common at the individual level (see Fehr and Tyran (2005) for a general discussion). For example, we ﬁnd that when
the poor outnumber the rich in majority voting, only about 30% of the rich vote in line with their pocketbook interest.
However, these rich voters are unlikely to be pivotal because about 80% of poor voters vote in line with their pocketbook.
In other words, the pocketbook prediction is robust to the rather pronounced deviation from pocketbook voting by rich
voters because they are not pivotal in this case.
While the asymmetry effect is in some sense a purely ‘‘mechanical’’ effect mapping individual preferences into majority
voting outcomes, it is perhaps surprising that it is observed at the aggregate level because of a possible countervailing
effect resulting from insincere voting. If voters anticipate the asymmetry effect, they expect to be pivotal with high
probability in some cases but expect to be largely irrelevant for the outcome in other cases. Deviations from pocketbook
voting are less costly when a voter is unlikely to be pivotal, and it seems plausible that such deviations are more likely in
this case. We indeed ﬁnd some evidence of insincere voting. For example, when the rich are in majority (RMV), we ﬁnd
that the rich vote much more in line with their pocketbook interest (about 60% vs. 30% when they are minority). Despite
the fact that in RMV many (60%) rich voters do vote their pocketbook, we observe frequent deviations from pocketbook
predictions in redistribution outcomes because inequality-averse rich voters are likely to be pivotal in this case.
Our paper adds to a relatively slim experimental literature on the role of social preferences in voting on redistribution.
Ackert et al. (2007) show that inequality aversion induces approval for redistributive taxes among voters who do not
beneﬁt from redistribution when taxes are not distorting but ﬁnd that voting is mainly in line with self-interested voting
in the presence of a trade-off between fairness and equality, a result in agreement with Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
However, Bolton and Ockenfels (2003) study the trade-off between fairness and efﬁciency in voting and ﬁnd that voters
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–14211408are about twice as likely to vote against their pocketbook interest in favor of a more fair compared to a more efﬁcient
allocation. Durante and Putterman (2009) investigate how self-interest vs. social preferences shape voting on redis-
tributive taxes both when voters are and are not affected by the outcome (i.e. are an impartial spectator) and show that
voters are willing to redistribute, in particular when the cost of doing so is low (see also Beckman et al., 2002). Grosser and
Reuben (2010) study voting on redistribution of incomes earned in a competitive market and observe support for income-
equalizing redistribution, in line with equilibrium predictions assuming pocketbook voting.2
Several experimental papers have investigated how variation in pivot probabilities may induce voters to cast votes that
deviate from their material self-interest. A prominent idea is that voters may use their votes to express moral views rather
than to instrumentally affect the redistribution outcome if they believe that their vote is unlikely to matter for the
redistribution outcome (e.g. Tyran, 2004; Shayo and Harel, 2012; Feddersen et al., 2009).
The literature on experimental committee decision making is also related to our paper, and some of that literature
discusses the role of fairness concerns (e.g. Eavey and Miller, 1984). However, that literature often uses complex designs
which do not have sharp predictions or that cannot clearly discriminate between alternative motivational accounts.
A paper in this tradition that is relatively closely related to ours is Sauermann and Kaiser (2010).
A close match to our paper is Tyran and Sausgruber (TS) (2006) who have ﬁrst noted the asymmetry property (their
result 1). Our experimental design differs in several ways from TS. TS study voting on one exogenously proposed
redistribution proposal while we allow the redistribution level to be endogenously determined. TS study zero-sum (i.e.
costless) redistribution while our design implements a trade-off between efﬁciency and equality. While TS have mainly
focused on the case where ‘‘a little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution’’, we study both aspects of the asymmetry,
including the case where the redistribution outcomes are unlikely to be affected despite a considerable concern for fair
distribution in the electorate. While TS were unable to directly test for the asymmetry effect (they only had one
treatment), we test for the asymmetry to arise in two treatments with majority voting, and provide structurally identical
control treatments with random dictator voting designed to eliminate it.
2. Experimental design
In all treatments, N¼5 voters are allocated to two income classes with R ‘‘rich’’ and P ‘‘poor’’ voters (N¼RþP). Voters
are homogenous within a class. The pocketbook interests of the rich are for low redistribution, the pocketbook interests of
the poor are, because of a built-in trade-off between equality and efﬁciency explained below, for moderate redistribution.
In each period, each voter simultaneously chooses a redistribution level ri. Voting is compulsory.
3 Our experimental design
has 4 treatments. In the 2 main treatments, the redistribution outcome is determined by majority voting, i.e. by the
decision of the median voter. In 2 otherwise identical control treatments, the outcome is determined by the random
dictator procedure, i.e. by a randomly chosen voter. The level chosen by the decisive voter is implemented for all voters.
At the end of each period, all voters are informed about the choice of the decisive voter and the resulting income
distribution but not about the distribution votes, and a new period begins. We use a partner design, i.e. group composition
is constant for all T¼15 periods.
In the two main treatments the redistribution outcome is determined by majority voting, and the treatments
exclusively differ by which income class is in majority. In treatment RMV, the rich are in majority (R¼3, P¼2), while
the poor are in majority (R¼2, P¼3) in treatment PMV. The two treatments with random dictator procedure are identical
to the respective treatments with majority voting in all respects (e.g. payoffs, class structure) except for how redistribution
outcomes are determined from individual votes. While in RMV and PMV the median voter determines the outcome,
redistribution levels are determined by a random draw from individual choices in treatments RMRD and PMRD.
Whether a voter is pivotal in majority voting is endogenous, i.e. depends on how others vote, and is not known to voters
ex ante. According to the asymmetry hypothesis, inequality aversion has asymmetric effects on redistribution outcomes in
majority voting across treatments because inequality-averse rich voters are more likely to induce redistribution outcomes
beyond the pocketbook prediction when the rich are in majority (in RMV) than when the poor are in majority (in PMV). In
the treatments with the random dictator procedure, we control the probability to be pivotal. In these treatments, the
probability of being pivotal is 1/N for each voter and the effect of inequality aversion on redistribution outcomes is
predicted to be symmetric, i.e. independent of the treatment.
2.1. Properties of the asymmetry effect
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic intuition of the asymmetry effect in majority voting on redistribution for 5 voters in 2 income
classes (see online supporting materials for the case of a continuum of voters in k classes). The vertical axis shows the2 The expression ‘‘pocketbook voting’’ is often used in ﬁeld studies to mean retrospective voting in which voters punish the incumbent if personal or
household ﬁnancial conditions have deteriorated (e.g. Duch and Stevenson, 2008). In contrast, we use the term ‘‘pocketbook voting’’ in the sense of voting
in line with material self-interest. This is possible in our study by virtue of experimental control. In our experiment, the properties and consequences of
alternative redistribution outcomes are known with certainty to voters.
3 Battaglini et al. (2010) show experimentally that participation in referenda is systematically affected by pivotality considerations in a framework
with differently informed voters.
Fig. 1. Redistribution outcomes in majority voting for a rich majority (left panels) and poor majority (right panels), without (top) and with (bottom)
inequality aversion.
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–1421 1409redistribution level r and the horizontal axis ranks the voters by income class. The squares represent the ideal positions of
rich voters, the triangles the ideal positions of poor voters. For example, panel 1 shows a case with 3 identical rich (self-
interested) voters who have ideal points at rR
n
and 2 (self-interested) poor voters with ideal points at rP
n
. The panels on the
left illustrate outcomes for rich majorities (RMV), the panels on the right for poor majorities (PMV). The upper panels show
cases with self-interested voters, the lower panels cases where some voters are inequality averse.4
Pocketbook voting by all voters (see upper panels) predicts dramatically different redistribution outcomes in RMV and
PMV. If all voters cast their votes according to the pocketbook, the median voter is rich in RMV and low redistribution at
rm¼rRn is the predicted outcome (see panel 1). In contrast, the median voter is poor in PMV, and an intermediate level of
redistribution at rm¼rPn is the predicted outcome (see panel 2).
The lower panels in Fig. 1 illustrate outcomes when some voters are inequality averse and vote sincerely according to
their preference. Panel 3 illustrates the outcome in RMV where one rich voter is inequality averse and casts a vote ri4rR
n
while all others vote according to the pocketbook. In this case, inequality aversion does affect the redistribution outcome
(rm4rR
n
). Panel 4 illustrates the case with a poor majority (PMV) where two voters are inequality-averse but the
redistribution outcome is not affected by inequality aversion and the same outcome prevails in PMV when no voter is
inequality averse (rm¼rPn).
The asymmetry in redistribution outcomes prevails in the example above because with a narrow rich majority, the
most inequality-averse rich voter drives the outcome (panel 3) but with a narrow poor majority, the least inequality-
averse poor voter drives the outcome (panel 4). Thus, a little inequality aversion goes a long a way in RMV (this is the
intuition discussed in Tyran and Sausgruber (2006)), but is irrelevant in PMV.
Table 1 illustrates how the asymmetry effect depends on the size of the electorate and the relative size of the two
income classes in a simple simulation exercise. We assume that all N voters have single-peaked preferences and that their4 The asymmetry effect assumes the existence of a systematic deviation from self-interest. In particular, voters are assumed to be either inequality-
averse or self-interested. For example, rich voters are assumed not to have status preferences, i.e. to vote for redistribution to increase inequality. Such
voters would tend to cancel out the votes of inequality-averse voters. The analogous case prevails if poor voters are assumed to be efﬁciency-loving, i.e. to
vote against their self-interest to increase inequality.
Table 1
Probability of obtaining redistribution outcomes in line with ‘‘pocketbook’’ prediction with inequality-averse voters
(r¼0.2).
No. rich voters (R) No. poor voters (P)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 – 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
2 0.64 – 0.99 0.99 1.00
3 0.51 – 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 0.82 0.41 – 1.00 1.00
5 0.66 0.33 – 1.00 1.00
6 0.90 0.66 0.26 – 1.00
7 0.97 0.85 0.21 – 1.00
8 0.94 0.80 0.50 0.17 –
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–14211410ideal points can be ordered as follows: self-interested rich (rR
n
)oinequality-averse richoself-interested poor (rP
n
)oinequality-
averse poor. That is, we assume that inequality aversion induces ideal points to shift in the direction of more redistribution, but
only moderately so. To keep the argument simple, we assume that rich and poor voters are equally likely to be inequality
averse (the argument can easily be extended to different probabilities across classes). In particular, we assume that voters are
sampled from a population with a share of r percent inequality-averse voters. All voters are sincere and N is an odd number.
If R4P (RMV), redistribution beyond the pocketbook is obtained if at least xRMV¼1/2 (R–Pþ1) inequality-averse rich voters are
sampled into the electorate. If P4R (PMV), this is the case if at least xPMV¼1/2 (RþPþ1) inequality-averse poor voters are
sampled into the electorate. The main point to note here is that for any (R,P) and (R0,P0), with R¼P0 and P¼R0, xPMV4xRMV. Thus,
obtaining redistribution in excess of the pocketbook prediction is more likely in RMV than in PMV.5
The probability of observing the pocketbook redistribution outcome, Prob(pocketbook), can be calculated using a
binomial distribution (in Table 1, we assume a share r¼0.2 of voters are inequality-averse). For example, in an electorate
with R¼3 and P¼2, Prob(pocketbook)¼(1r)3¼0.51. In contrast, with R¼2 and P¼3, the probability is 1r3¼0.99, i.e.
the probability to observe the pocketbook outcome is about twice as large in the case of the poor majority. The numbers in
Table 1 below the main diagonal are for the case R4P. Importantly, these numbers are smaller than those above the
diagonal for P4R which illustrates the asymmetry effect. That is, pocketbook redistribution outcomes are generally more
likely with a poor majority than with a rich majority.
The asymmetry effect is particularly pronounced for ‘‘narrow’’ majorities. For example, holding the size of the electorate
constant at N¼9, the probabilities to obtain the pocketbook outcome are essentially the same for R:P¼8:1 as for R:P¼1:8
(0.94 vs. 0.99) but the probabilities are much different for R:P¼5:4 and R:P¼4:5 (0.33 vs. 1.0). For a narrow rich majority,
inequality aversion matters a lot while for the mirrored case with a poor majority it does not (the numbers above the
diagonal are close to 1.0).
The asymmetry effect is particularly pronounced when inequality aversion looms large (r is large) and when the size of
the electorate N increases. For example, if r¼0.3, Prob(pocketbook) is 0.34 for RMV (R¼3, P¼2) but still 0.97 for PMV.
Thus, the asymmetry grows from about 2:1 (0.99 vs. 0.51, see Table 1) with r¼0.2 to about 3:1 with r¼0.3. The
asymmetry is also more pronounced in larger electorates as long as majorities are narrow. For example, holding the ratio
R:P constant at 3:2, the probability to obtain a pocketbook outcome is 0.51 with N¼5 but only 0.43 with N¼15 (not shown
in the table).2.2. Payoffs
Table 2 shows the payoffs used in all 4 treatments by income class and redistribution level.6 The rich have higher
maximum payoffs than the poor (200 vs. 92) and have higher payoffs at all redistribution levels except for the maximum
redistribution level which equalizes incomes (payoff of 27 each). Note that payoffs are common information and there is
no uncertainty over one’s (future) income position such that voting does not take place behind a ‘‘veil of ignorance’’ (see
Cabrales et al. (2012) for an experimental study of social insurance).5 Note that this statement pertains only to the probability of observing redistribution beyond the pocketbook. Additional assumptions on the
intensity of inequality aversion would be needed to make precise statements about the extent of the deviation from pocketbook voting. For example, Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) assume that spite is stronger than generosity which implies that the ‘‘poor’’ deviate more from their ideal points than the rich, if they
deviate at all.
6 Instructions use neutral labeling. The ‘‘redistribution level’’ is called ‘‘allocation’’, and the ‘‘rich’’ and the ‘‘poor’’ are called ‘‘X-type’’ and ‘‘Y-type’’,
respectively. As noted by a referee, the expression ‘‘redistribution’’ used throughout the paper should be interpreted with care because distribution
choices are not made starting from an earned or endowed primary distribution or clear status quo. In fact, redistribution choices with entitlements may
differ from (re)distribution choices without clear entitlements.
Table 2
Payoffs.
Redistribution
level
Payoff
rich
Payoff
poor
Redistribution
level
Payoff
rich
Payoff
poor
0 194 50 11 114 86
1 200 60 12 107 80
2 194 64 13 100 75
3 187 68 14 92 70
4 179 72 15 84 64
5 169 76 16 76 59
6 159 80 17 68 54
7 146 86 18 58 47
8 132 92 19 49 41
9 128 91 20 41 36
10 122 89 21 27 27
Fig. 2. Trade-off between efﬁciency and equality (vertical lines show redistribution outcomes according to pocketbook voting in RMV and PMV).
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–1421 1411Payoffs were chosen to reﬂect a trade-off between efﬁciency and equity. Fig. 2 shows that redistribution decreases
efﬁciency (the sum of the payoffs normalized to the sum of maximum payoffs) but increases equality (measured by the
payoff of the poor relative to the rich). Rich voters maximize their income at low redistribution (rR
n¼1), and poor voters at
intermediate redistribution (rR
n¼8).7 Assuming pocketbook voting, a poor voter earns only about a third of a rich voter
(¼60/200) in equilibrium in RMV. The equilibrium ratio of payoffs with PMV is more equal. At rPn¼8, the poor earn about
70 percent (¼92/132) of what the rich earn.
Inequality aversion may cause redistribution outcomes to deviate from rR
n
and rP
n
. For example, the poor may be spiteful
and willing to sacriﬁce own payoff to reduce the payoff of the rich. However, doing so does not do much damage as can be
seen in Fig. 2. For example, inequality is not reduced much by moving from r¼8 to 15 but comes at a hefty cost (about 1/3)
in terms of efﬁciency. Thus, poor voters need to be strongly averse to inequality8 to ﬁnd spiteful choices worthwhile. For
the rich, generously giving up own payoff to increase payoffs of the poor (choices in {2,y,8}) is consistent with high values
of b in the model of FS. However, redistribution beyond r¼10 implies b41, which is ruled out by assumption in the model
of FS. In short, we do not expect redistribution outcomes above 8 given the inequality aversion typically assumed in the
fairness model of FS.7 Table 2 was part of the written instructions (see Appendix C). The payoffs were calculated from a standard model of Meltzer and Richards (1981).
8 For example, choosing r¼11 requires a¼1 in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–14211412In total, 180 undergraduate students9 participated in the experiment as follows: 60 in RMV, 40 in PMV, 40 in RMRD and
40 in PMRD. Points earned during the experiment were exchanged at a rate of 200 points for 1 Euro. A show-up fee of 4
Euro was paid to all participants at the end of the experiment in addition to earnings during the experiment. The
experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).3. Results
Section 3.1 shows that redistribution in RMV exceeds the level predicted by pocketbook voting, but that redistribution
is almost perfectly in line with pocketbook voting in PMV. Thus, we ﬁnd pronounced asymmetry in how inequality
aversion affects majority voting on redistribution. Section 3.2 shows that asymmetry is absent in the control treatments
with a random dictator voting mechanism. Section 3.3 discusses that the asymmetry effect may induce insincere voting.
We ﬁnd that insincere voting increases with low pivotality according to the asymmetry hypothesis but is not pronounced
enough to swamp the asymmetry effect.3.1. The pocketbook rules with PMV but not with RMV
Fig. 3 shows the main results for majority voting with a rich majority (RMV). We observe redistribution outcomes
averaged across groups (rm, see dashed line) beyond the pocketbook prediction (rR
n¼1, solid thin line) already in period 1
(p¼0.003, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, WSR), and rm remains at levels close to 4 throughout (average rm is 3.72
over all periods). The ‘‘excessive’’ redistribution is mainly due to the voting of the rich with an average vote of vR¼2.62
(p¼0.012, WSR). In contrast, voting of the poor is quite close to rPn¼8 (the average is vP¼8.40 over all periods; p¼0.209,
WSR).10 The fact that rm is closer to vR than vP reﬂects the fact that the rich tend to be pivotal in RMV.
11 The fact that
rm4vR reﬂects that the inequality-averse rich tend to be pivotal, i.e. they drive the redistribution outcome in RMV.
12
In summary, the remarkable ﬁnding from RMV is that while the poor vote quite in line with material self-interest, and the
rich on average only deviate somewhat on the generous side, the average redistribution outcome is considerably more
equal than predicted by pocketbook voting (index of inequality is 0.39 rather than 0.3 as predicted).
Voting is rather heterogeneous across the 12 electorates or groups in RMV. Overall, less than half (82/180) of the group-
level outcomes are in line with pocketbook voting. While 5 groups have redistribution outcomes broadly in line with the
pocketbook voting (i.e. deviate by 2 or fewer increments from rR
n¼1.0), 7 groups are clearly not in line with such
predictions. Four of these groups implement intermediate levels of redistribution between 3 and 5 on average, while 3
groups have redistribution levels that are close to redistribution level 8.13 In one of these groups this is due to all three rich
subjects consistently voting for r¼8, in the other two groups there are two and respectively one subject doing so. In these
cases, the median voter gives up a payoff of 68 points (¼200–132, see Table 1) to increase the income of the poor voters by
32 (¼92–60) points each. The choice reduced efﬁciency only by about 6 percent but considerably increased equality (the
ratio of incomes of rich to poor falls from 3.3 to 1.4). While voting reduces inequality considerably, the resulting secondary9 Participants were students recruited at the University of Innsbruck, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 46.1% of the participants were female, 60% were
from the Faculty of Management and Economics.
10 To give a measure of noisiness behind these ﬁgures, Appendix B contains graphs showing error bars for vR and vP in all treatments.
11 Averaged over all periods, the distance to median in redistribution levels is 1.10 for the rich and 4.68 for the poor voters (p¼0.005, Wilcoxon
matched pairs test, WMP).
12 2.62 vs. 3.72, p¼0.002, WMP.
13 Observing a rich voter to opt for redistribution level 8 is consistent with maximin preferences.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
re
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
le
ve
l
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
period
rich poor outcome
Fig. 4. Average votes and redistribution outcomes in PMV (n¼40).
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–1421 1413income distribution is still rather unequal overall. The average payoff in the RMV treatment is (excluding the show-up fee)
13.2 Euro (rich) and 5.4 Euro (poor) (p¼0.000, two-sided Mann–Whitney test, MW).
Fig. 4 shows that redistribution outcomes are almost perfectly in line with pocketbook voting when the poor are in
majority (PMV). Average redistribution is rm¼7.96 (see dashed line) which is very close to rPn¼8, and the prediction rPn¼8 is
implemented exactly in 95 percent of the cases (¼114 out of 120 group-level observations). As a result, average total
payoffs (excluding the show-up fee) are relatively equal in PMV (6.9 Euro for the poor and 9.9 Euro for the rich14 ). The
redistribution outcome rm is close to but systematically below the graph representing the average vote vP of the poor (see
solid black line) in PMV.15 The fact that rm is closer to vP than vR reﬂects that the poor tend to be the pivotal voters in
PMV.16 The fact that rmovP reﬂects that the inequality-averse poor are unlikely to be pivotal, i.e. tend not to drive the
redistribution outcome.
The predictive success of ‘‘pocketbook voting’’ for aggregate outcomes in PMV is striking because its predictions are
rather imprecise if not plainly wrong for individual votes (see Appendix A for distributions of individual votes). The
average vote of the rich is clearly biased away from their pocketbook optimum (rR
n¼1) throughout all 15 periods (vR¼3.89,
p¼0.012 WSR, see bold gray line in Fig. 4). In addition, a considerable share of the poor consistently vote above rPn¼8 and
the average vote over all periods is vP¼8.88 (p¼0.019 WSR, see bold black line in Fig. 4). While only 53 percent of all
voters (18 poor and 3 rich) vote their pocketbook interest in at least 2/3 of the periods, the redistribution outcome is
almost always (in 95 percent of group-level outcomes) consistent with pocketbook voting. Thus, in line with the
asymmetry hypothesis, we ﬁnd that – despite many voters supporting redistribution beyond the pocketbook – inequality
aversion does not matter for aggregate outcomes when the poor are in majority.17
3.2. Results from random dictator treatments
We now show that there is in fact no asymmetry in the deviation from pocketbook outcomes across class structures
when there should be none according to the asymmetry hypothesis. To test, we run treatments with an exogenous and
constant probability to be decisive. Importantly, the probability is the same (1/N¼0.2) for all voters in both treatments, i.e.
does not depend on which class is in majority. We implement two treatments with random dictator decision making.
Treatment RMRD has a rich majority, and treatment PMRD has a poor majority. Note that these treatments are identical to
RMV and PMV in all respects except for the voting rule. Our main ﬁnding is that the deviation from pocketbook outcomes
is not different across treatments, i.e. is independent of which class is in majority.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the average redistribution choice by income class for random dictator voting in RMRD and PMRD.
Both the poor and the rich make random dictator choices slightly above predictions in PMRD (dP¼8.56 vs. rPn¼8, p¼0.030;
dR¼1.50 vs. rRn¼1, p¼0.030, WSR). In RMRD average choices are not signiﬁcantly different from predictions (poor: 8.40 vs.
8, p¼0.356; rich: 1.28 vs. 1, p¼0.110, WSR).
The heavily dashed lines in Figs. 5 and 6 show the implemented redistribution in the two treatments. Implemented
redistribution is noisy because one choice is picked at random to determine the outcome in these treatments, and the
choice may come from a rich or a poor voter. Importantly, we ﬁnd that the deviation of predicted and implemented
redistribution is not different across treatments. The pocketbook prediction rd
n
is 5.20 in PMRD and 3.80 in RMRD (see14 The difference is nevertheless signiﬁcant: p¼0.001, MW.
15 7.96 vs. 8.88, p¼0.019, WMP.
16 The average (absolute) distances are rmvR¼4.07 and vPrm¼0.92 (p¼0.050, WMP).
17 Additional analysis (available from the authors on request) suggests that voters are able to learn whether they are pivotal, that rich voters are
more likely to be pivotal when in majority and more so when voting for redistribution beyond than below their pocketbook interests. Similar results hold
for poor voters.
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Fig. 5. Average votes and redistribution outcomes in RMRD (n¼40).
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Fig. 6. Average votes and redistribution outcomes in PMRD (n¼40).
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–14211414dashed horizontal lines). These predictions differ from those in RMV and PMV because of a simple composition effect [note
that rd
n¼(RrRnþPrPn)/N]. Overall (weighted) dictator choices are rd¼(RdRþPdP)/N. The absolute deviation rdrdn is 1.14 in
PMRD (6.34 vs. 5.20), and 0.57 in RMRD (4.37 vs. 3.80), and these deviations are not signiﬁcantly different (p¼0.371, MW).
In contrast, the deviations from predicted outcomes are signiﬁcant with majority voting i.e. across RMV and PMV. The
deviation rmrRn is 2.72 in RMV (3.72 vs. 1) and rPnrm¼0.04 in PMV (7.96 vs. 8), which is signiﬁcantly different
(p¼0.001, MW). In summary, the deviations between predicted and observed redistribution outcomes are small (about
0.6) and do not differ across treatments in the random dictator procedure, but deviations are large (about 2.8) and
signiﬁcant in the majority voting treatments.
Our ﬁnding that the deviation of implemented redistribution from the pocketbook prediction does not differ across
treatments when pivotality is independent of class structure also holds for individual choices. This is true for both rich and
poor voters, and for both the level and the variance of choices. A comparison of PMRD vs. RMRD reveals that neither rich
voters (1.50 vs. 1.28, p¼0.419, MW) nor poor voters (8.56 vs. 8.40, p¼0.522, MW) choose differently across these
treatments on average. The average within-group standard deviation for rich voters is 0.74 in PMRD and 0.55 in RMRD
(p¼0.957, MW). For the poor voters the respective numbers are 0.77 vs. 1.31 (p¼0.394, MW).
3.3. Discussion of results: insincere voting
The asymmetry hypothesis claims that sincere voting for redistribution beyond the pocketbook by a given share of
inequality-averse voters is more or less likely to translate into redistribution outcomes beyond pocketbook interests
depending on how likely inequality-averse voters are to be pivotal; pivotality, in turn, depends on the relative strength of
income classes. The discussion above has shown that we ﬁnd support for the asymmetry hypothesis in majority voting in
the sense that aggregate redistribution outcomes are much less in line with pocketbook voting in RMV than in PMV. This
holds both with respect to overall average redistribution levels and with respect to group-level outcomes. For example, 46
vs. 95 percent of group-level outcomes are in line with pocketbook voting in RMV and PMV, respectively.
These results are surprising because voters may anticipate and strategically respond to the differential pivot
probabilities by voting insincerely. For example, rich voters may anticipate that they are more likely to be pivotal when
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costly in PMV than in RMV. Voters may react to these differences in expected cost by voting carelessly (thus increasing the
noise) or by expressing support for what may be seen as a morally worthy cause (thus increasing the bias towards
redistribution beyond the pocketbook prediction). Note that incentives for insincere voting are completely absent in the
treatments with random dictator choice.
A comparison of voting patterns across RMV and PMV reveals that deviations from pocketbook voting are indeed more
common for rich voters when they are less likely to be pivotal but the evidence is weak for poor voters. For example,
among the rich, we ﬁnd that 57 percent (¼309/540) of individual votes are in line with the pocketbook interests (rmn ¼1) in
RMV but only 32 percent (¼76/240) are in PMV. The difference is signiﬁcant (p¼0.000, w2 test). Yet, deviations by the rich
mainly increase noise rather than the average vote.18 Similar results hold for poor voters.19
Insincere voting may also explain some of the apparent differences in individual choices across voting rules.
However, the comparison is less sharp in this case. The reason is that while we control the pivot probability
in the random dictator treatments (it is 0.2), the absolute level of that probability is not known in the voting treatments.
We do know from the asymmetry hypothesis that this probability is higher for rich voters in RMV than PMV.20
Alternatively, differences in individual voting across voting rules may also be explained by rich voters deviating less from
rR
n
in RMRD than in PMV because they anticipate relatively fair redistribution outcomes when a poor voter happens to be
the dictator.
3.4. Discussion of results: more than two income classes
We have tested the asymmetry effect in a simple laboratory environment with two income classes. The experimental
results provide support for the effect since we ﬁnd that the asymmetry effect prevails when we expect it to be present (in
majority voting) and does not prevail when we do not expect it to be present (in the random dictator treatments). In the
speciﬁc context of two income classes, the interpretation of the asymmetry effect is clear and simple: inequality aversion
matters more for redistribution outcomes in majority voting with a rich majority than with a poor majority. Given the fact
that there are few if any societies in which the rich are in majority, the result seems to indicate that inequality aversion
should not matter much in the ﬁeld. Below, we use examples with more than two (three, to keep it simple) income classes
to explain that this interpretation is mistaken.
The simple examples below serve to illustrate that the asymmetry effect does not hinge on the condition that the rich
are in majority. Instead, the general condition (see the discussion in the online supporting materials for the general case)
for the asymmetry effect to prevail is that the median voter is fair-minded. How likely that is depends on the structure of
income classes. More speciﬁcally, it depends on whether the share of fair-minded voters in the class containing the median
voter and the classes above (i.e. those richer than the median class) is sufﬁcient to induce the aggregate voting outcome
to tip.
Consider a society with N voters in 3 homogeneous income classes. Suppose 20% of voters are rich, 50% are middle class,
and 30% are poor. Suppose that 70% of voters are self-interested and cast votes according to their ideal points (rR
n¼1 for the
rich, rM
n ¼3, and rPn¼8 for the middle-class and poor voters, respectively), while 30% of voters in all income classes are
slightly averse to inequality in the sense that they prefer redistribution at one increment above the respective ideal points
of self-interested voters. We assume all voters cast votes sincerely.
In this society, the median voter is a member of the middle class and is unlikely to be inequality averse.
The share of middle-class voters willing to vote for r4rM
n
is only 15% of the electorate (i.e. 30% of middle-class
voters who comprise half of the electorate). Inequality aversion among the rich does not matter since they are assumed to
be only mildly inequality averse, if at all, and therefore none of the rich voters opts for r4rM
n
. Thus, the rich (20%
of the electorate) plus the self-interested middle-class voters (35% of the electorate) constitute a majority and the
median voter therefore is a self-interested middle-class voter (note that inequality aversion among the poor is
irrelevant for the redistribution outcome in this example). In conclusion, the fact that 30% of all voters are
fair-minded does not matter for the redistribution outcome and looks as if all voters were strictly self interested (rM
n
prevails).
Now consider an electorate with a different structure of income classes while holding the concern for inequality
constant at the level of the previous example (i.e. 30% of voters in all classes have a mild concern for equality). Speciﬁcally,
assume that some middle-class voters slip into poverty, such that the distribution across income classes is now 20% rich,18 In RMV, the average within-group standard deviation of votes among the rich is less than half that of PMV (1.06 vs. 2.29, p¼0.021, MW, based on a
comparison of 12 and 8 independent group observations in RMV and PMV, respectively). But the average vote of the rich is not signiﬁcantly different
between RMV and in PMV (2.62 vs. 3.89, p¼0.123, MW).
19 As for the rich, poor voters are more likely to deviate from rP
n
when they are in minority: 51% (¼183/360) and 78% (¼281/360) of poor voters vote
in line with pocketbook in RMV and PMV, respectively. p¼0.000, w2 test. While the average within-group standard deviation of votes is higher in RMV
than PMV (2.12 vs. 0.22, p¼0.002, MW), average votes do not differ across the treatments (8.40 vs. 8.88, p¼0.396, MW).
20 Additional analysis (not reported here) suggests that rich voters were able to learn that their pivot probability was high (above 0.2) in RMV but
low in PMV, and conversely for poor voters. For completeness, we note that for the rich both the average (3.89 vs. 1.50, p¼0.007, MW) and the standard
deviation (2.29 vs. 0.74, p¼0.027 MW) are different across PMV than PMRD. Neither is the case for the poor voters (8.88 vs. 8.56, p¼0.958, MW; 0.77
vs. 0.22, p¼0.388, MW). There are no differences in levels or standard deviations for either rich or poor voters when comparing RMV with RMRD.
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but is now likely to be an inequality-averse voter. To reason is that the share of middle-class voters willing to vote for
r4rM
n
is now 12% of the electorate (i.e. 30% of middle-class voters who comprise 40% of the electorate). Thus, the rich (20%
of the electorate) plus the self-interested middle-class voters (28% of the electorate) now constitute a minority and the
median voter therefore is a fair-minded middle-class voter (note that inequality aversion among the rich and the poor is
still irrelevant for the redistribution outcome in the example). As a consequence, the redistribution outcome is r4rM
n
and
fairness concerns do matter for the redistribution outcome.
The upshot of the discussion above is that whether a given amount of fairness concerns matter for the redistribution
outcome is driven by the structure of income classes. Given information about the structure of income classes and the
prevalence of fairness concerns, the asymmetry effect can be used to predict when fairness concerns do not matter (as in
the ﬁrst case above) or do matter (as in the second case above).
4. Concluding remarks
A burgeoning literature has convincingly shown that concerns for a fair distribution are common but little attention has
been devoted to how it may affect voting on redistribution. Whether fairness concerns matter for redistribution outcomes
in majority voting depends on whether inequality-averse voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the income
class structure of the electorate and we show that its effect is asymmetric. Our results support the idea that a given
amount of fairness concerns matter when few fair-minded voters are sufﬁcient to tip the balance in majority voting, but do
not matter much when many are needed.
While the asymmetry effect extends to redistribution in electorates with more than two income classes in theory, we
would like to caution the reader to extrapolate the willingness to redistribute beyond the pocketbook observed in our
study because the concern for fairness manifested in our experiment may not be typical for other samples. For example,
Alesina and Giuliano (2010) note that different cultures emphasize the relative merits of equality versus individualism in
different ways, and different historical experiences shape social norms about what is acceptable in terms of inequality (for
a study of cultural effects on cooperation see Hermann et al. (2008)).
An interesting alley for further experimental investigation is how fair-minded voting is shaped by the conditions that
can be controlled in an experiment. For example, voting for inequality-reducing redistribution may be less common when
incomes are earned and voters therefore feel entitled to their incomes (see Fong (2001) for survey evidence; Cappelen et al.
(2010) for dictator games with production; Esarey et al. (2012) for voting on redistribution). The absence of such
entitlements in our design may have induced voters to think of choosing a distribution rather than actually redistributing
incomes with ﬁrm entitlements. On the other hand, voting for inequality-reducing redistribution may be more common
when the trade-off between efﬁciency and equality is less pronounced than in our design because preferences for efﬁcient
outcomes seem to be common (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002). Indeed, Durante and Putterman (2009) provide evidence
showing that the support for redistribution decreases with its private and social cost.
In a broader perspective, our paper adds to an emerging literature discussing the conditions when fairness concerns in a
heterogeneous population matter for aggregate outcomes (e.g. Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Sobel, 2009; Schmidt, 2011). One
way to read our results is as a kind of ‘‘robustness test’’ of the conventional median voter theory which assumes that the
median voter is strictly self-interested. Our results suggest that fairness preferences may matter much or be essentially
irrelevant since the outcomes of majority voting on redistribution may look as if all voters were strictly self-interested.
Which effect prevails depends, according to our analysis, on the structure of income classes which can be reasonably well
measured in the ﬁeld. Thus, we believe our experimental ﬁnding can provide interesting directions for ﬁeld research. Our
results suggest that relating (easily observable) redistribution outcomes to particular (easily observable) aspects of the
structure of income classes may provide a promising new perspective to investigating the role of (only indirectly
observable) fairness preferences in democratic redistribution.
Appendix A. Distribution of individual redistribution choices by treatment and class
The following ﬁgures show the distribution of redistribution choices by treatment and class over all periods
The distributions are split by whether a chosen r is different (black bars) or equal (gray bars) from the outcome r0 at
various levels of r. Thus, the black bars indicate instances in which voters experience that their choice was not pivotal.
See Figs. A.1–A.4.
Appendix B. Average redistribution choices by treatment and class
The following ﬁgures show average redistribution choices by rich and poor voters (see dots) plus the 2-sided conﬁdence
intervals (calculated from standard deviation of means between groups) over time for all treatments.
See Figs. B.1–B.4.21 To keep the argument simple, we assume that the change in the structure of income classes does not affect voters’ ideal points (voters would generally
demand less redistribution in a model of Meltzer Richards but fair-minded voters would demand more redistribution in model of Fehr and Schmidt).
Fig. A.1. PMV distribution of redistribution levels chosen by rich voters (n¼540).
Fig. A.2. RMV distribution of redistribution levels chosen by rich voters (n¼360).
Fig. A.3. PMV distribution of redistribution levels chosen by poor voters (n¼360).
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Fig. A.4. RMV distribution of redistribution levels chosen by poor voters (n¼240).
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Fig. B.1. Choices in RMV (n¼60).
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Fig. B.2. Choices in PMV (n¼40).
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Fig. B.3. Choices in RMRD (n¼40).
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Fig. B.4. Choices in PMRD (n¼40).
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Welcome to the experiment. If you read these instructions carefully and follow the rules you can earn money in this
experiment. The money will be paid out in cash right after the experiment. During the experiment, we denote earnings in
points which are converted to Euro as follows: 200 points¼1 Euro.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the entire experiment. If you have a question,
please raise your hand and we will answer your question individually. It is important that you follow this rule because
otherwise the results are worthless to us.
In this experiment, participants are randomly sorted into groups of 5. This means that you are in a group with 4 other
participants. The same 5 participants stay in a group throughout the entire experiment.
In your group, there are 2 members of type Y and 3 members of type X. The computer randomly determines who is of
which type.
What are the consequences of being type X or typeY? Players of type X have better opportunities to earn money in
the experiment.
In this experiment, your task is to decide about the distribution of incomes within your group.C.1. Speciﬁc instructions for the experiment
You are of type Y. In this experiment, every participant earns an individual income. You vote about whether and to
what extent you would like to redistribute these incomes by choosing an ‘‘allocation.’’
The experiment has 15 periods in total. In each period, you have to vote about the redistribution of the incomes in your
group. The outcome of the vote in each period determines your and the other 4 group members’ payoff.C.2. Redistribution decision
Table C1 shows the incomes for each allocation. There are 22 possible allocations in total. You and the other
participants in your group decide about the allocation for your group and thus about the distribution of incomes in
your group.
Table C1
Incomes for different allocations.
Allocation Income
of X types
Income
of Y types
0 194 50
1 200 60
2 194 64
3 187 68
4 179 72
5 169 76
6 159 80
7 146 86
8 132 92
9 128 91
10 122 89
11 114 86
12 107 80
13 100 75
14 92 70
15 84 64
16 76 59
17 68 54
18 58 47
19 49 41
20 41 36
21 27 27
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The redistribution decision is made according to the following rules: you and the other group members each choose an
allocation by typing an allocation number into the decision screen that will pop up. The allocation numbers chosen by all
group members are sorted from low to high. The number in the middle, i.e. the third number, in this list is the median
allocation. The median allocation determines the incomes of all group members in this period (see Table C1).
Example: Suppose you have chosen allocation 12. The other four group members have chosen allocations: 11, 2, 17, 5.
Sorted from low to high we have1: 22: 53: 11 (¼median allocation)
4: 125: 17The median allocation and, thus, the group’s redistribution decision, in this example is 11 which means that X types
earn 114 points and Y types earn 86 points.
Suppose you had chosen 8 instead of 12 in the situation above while the others choose as before (11, 2, 17, 5). In this
case, your allocation choice is the third in the sequence. Therefore, the median allocation would be 8 and the group’s
redistribution decision is therefore 8, which means that X types earn 132 points and Y types 92 points.
C.2.2. For treatments RMRD and PMRD
The redistribution decision is made according to the following rules: you and the other group members each choose an
allocation by typing an allocation number into the decision screen that will pop up. The computer then randomly draws
one of these allocations with equal probability (20%). The random draw from the choices determines the incomes of the
group members in this period (see Table C1).
Example: Suppose you choose allocation 12. The other members of your group choose the allocations: 11, 2, 17, 5. The
computer draws one of these 5 allocation randomly and all allocations are equally likely to be implemented. For example,
if allocation 11 is drawn, all group members obtain the income shown for allocation 11 in Table C1 (114 points for X types
and 86 points for Y types).
C.2.3. All treatments
See Table C1.
C.2.4. How you make your decision
In each period, you choose an allocation by typing a number from 0 to 21 into the decision screen. When all group
members have made their decisions, the group choice is determined and displayed. At the end of the period you will see
W. Ho¨chtl et al. / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1406–1421 1421the following information on the outcome screen: [You are typey, The group’s allocation decision isy, Your income is
y, Group members of type X earnedy, group members of type Y earnedy].
The experiment is about to start. If you have a question please raise your hand.
Appendix D. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
euroecorev.2012.07.004.References
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